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CONSUMER REDRESS THROUGH ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT: THEORY AND PRACTICE' 
by 
Peter Finkle and David Cohen" 
There are significant dificulties in providing consumers with redress 
because dispute resolution costs are high relative to the sums being 
sought. Consumers also manifest a reluctance to enter legal processes 
for other reasons. This prompted the creation of user-friendly small 
claims courts and encouraged the discussion and sometimes the use 
of non-judicial, alternative dispute resolution forums for addressing 
consumer redress. This paper explores the theoretical and practical 
distinction between these two types of dispute resolution forums. The 
practical differences are examined on the basis of observation of both 
types of forums and discussions with practitioners of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
The paper concludes that while there are significant theoretical dif- 
ferences between the two forums, few of these are inherent. In fact, 
there is evidence that small claims courts have begun to adopt a 
number of alternative dispute resolution techniques and could adopt 
more. Nonetheless, some alternative dispute resolution techniques 
which are not susceptible to adoption by courts are, based on evidence 
generated through field research for this paper, clearly more eflcient 
for resolving particular types of disputes than analagous techniques 
used in courts. It is probable as well, though the evidence collected in 
field observation is not conclusive, that some types of disputes are 
better resolved by small claims courts. 
A more effective consumer redress system might be achieved if the 
forum and techniques were more appropriatelyfitted to the particular 
fuss. The paper offers guidance on how this might be achieved, and 
the benefits and costs to governments, business and consumers asso- 
ciated with obtaining more effective consumer redress. 
* While this research was sponsored by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 
neither that Department nor the Government of Canada are responsible for the 
contents or recommendations in this paper. June 15, 1993. 
** Peter Finkle is a senior policy analyst with the Consumer Affairs Bureau and 
Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa David Cohen is a Pro- 
fessor of Law at the Faculty of Law, the University of British Columbia. 
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the field research, legal research, and 
editing of Lori Harris, a law student at the University of British Columbia, Bruce 
MacAllister, a public administration student at Guelph, and Stephane Bouthil- 
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the Ontario Motor Vehicle Arbitration Plan. 
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Le recours du consommateur, le cour des petites 
crCances, et les techniques de recharge du r2glement 
des diffbrends: thCorie et rCalitC 
11 est dificile d'offrir des recours aux consommateurs, parce que les 
colits relatifs au rtglement des diffe'rends sont e'leve's comparativenzent 
aux sonzmes qui sont re'clamkes. Les consomnzateurs sont re'ticents 
pour d'autres motifs encore & intenter des poursuites judiciaires. Cet 
e'tat de choses a e'te' & l'origine de la cre'ation des cours des petites 
cre'ances, d 'accb  plus facile, et a favorise' la recherche de tribunes 
non judiciaires de r2glenzent des diffkrends ainsi que, paqois, le 
recours 2 ces tribunes. L.e pre'sent document exantine la distinction 
the'orique et concrtte entre ces deux genres de tribunes de rtglenzent 
des diffe'rends. Les diffe'rences concrttes sont e'tudikes sur la base de 
l'observation des deux genres de tribunes et de discussions avec les 
spe'cialistes d'autres.fonnules de rtglement des diffe'rends. 
- -- 
Le docunzent conclut que les diffkrences the'oriques conside'rables 
entre les deux tribunes rarement leur sont inhe'rentes. En fait, i f  a e'te' 
constate' que les cours des petites crkances ont commence' 6 adopter 
un certain nombre de techniques de rechange en ce qui concerne le 
r2glement des diffkrends et qu 'elles pourraient en adopter &vantage. 
Ne'anmoins, d'aprts les tkmoignages recueillis au cours de la recher- 
che effectue'e sur le terrain aux Bns du pre'sent document, certaines 
autres formules de  r2glement des diffe'rends, qui ne sauraient Etre 
adoptkes par le i  tribunaux, permettent beaucoup mieux de rbsoudre 
certaines catkgories de diffe'rends que les techniques analogues 
utilise'es par les tribunaux. Bien que les tbnoignages recueillis ne 
soient pas concluants, i f  est aussi probable que les cours des petites 
cre'ances sont mieux plackes pour re'soudre certains genres de dif- 
fe'rends. 
Un syst6me plus efJicace de redressement des diffe'rends pourrait &re 
mis en place si la tribune et les techniques e'taient mieux adapte'es au 
probltme particulier. Le document offre des conseils sur la f a p n  d 'y  
parvenir ainsi que sur les avantages et les coLits que ne'cessiterait, pour 
les gouvernements, les entreprises et les consommateurs, la mise en 
place de mkcanismes de redressement plus eflcaces. 
"kr the forum fit the fuss." 
Prof. Frank E.A. Sander, Harvard Law School 
1. Introduction 
One of the most frequently mentioned complaints made by consum- 
ers is their perceived difficulty in obtaining redress when their expec- 
tations in relation to purchases or other acquisitions of goods or serv- 
ices are disappointed. Problems may relate to delivery dates, product 
design or performance, durability or a range of associated product 
defects.' These concerns were repeatedly raised by consumers during 
1 For the most part, our analysis focuses on losses associated with defects which 
have not generated personal injuries, or which do not present risks to personal 
health or safety. Product liability risks, given the existence of public health 
insurance, social attitudes towards loss and risk spreading in the case of personal 
injuries, and the litigation incentives associated with large claims, present very 
Heinonline - -  13 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 82 1993 
Vol. 13 Redress Through A ftemative Dispute Resolution 83 
recent informal consultations undertaken by officials from Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs Canada on the development of a new consumer 
framework p ~ l i c y . ~  Consumer dissatisfaction with redress mechan- 
isms is understandable and in many cases well-founded. 
The vast majority of consumer disputes involves relatively low- 
priced goods, services or credit, where the costs associated with re- 
dress3 substantially exceed the expected benefits associated with re- 
covery. Moreover, because the benefits will be received, if at all, at 
some point in the future, the value of that recovery must be discounted 
to its present value. This asymmetry between the investment costs of 
redress and the value of expected recovery is exacerbated if one as- 
sumes that consumers engaged in redress are risk averse. Indeed, it is 
often economically irrational from the perspective of an individual 
consumer (depending on the value he or she puts on time) even to 
complain to the seller as a means of seeking redress, especially if there 
is a significant risk that such an action may be f ~ t i l e . ~  
The problem of redress for consumers, reduced to its simplest di- 
mensions, is how to lower the actual and perceived time, stress and 
money necessary to participate effectively in redress  mechanism^.^ 
This is a difficult task for our legal system for historical reasons. Tra- 
ditionally, the common law has separated the process of determining 
the existence of a valid legal claim through a trial from the process of 
forcing the defendant who has lost to pay the judgement. In most 
situations, then, a consumer seeking redress from a defendant-seller 
must anticipate the costs and risks of two legal procedures. First, the 
consumer has to sustain the costs of bringing the case to trial and, 
second, there are often additional expenses associated with suing on 
a judgement if payment is not voluntarily made.6 The consumer must 
different public policy issues than do consumer product quality risks which 
generate either economic losses, psychic losses, or both. 
2 As reported by officials in Consr~mer and Corporate Affairs Canada after 
informal consultations in five major Canadian cities, October 1991. 
3 These will include time, personal investigative costs, the costs of professional or 
para-legal services, and the stress associated with participation in an institution 
which is likely to be unfamiliar to many consumers. 
4 It is clear that the most effective institutional mechanism to reduce consumer 
dissatisfaction with the quality of consumer goods and services is a highly 
competitive market place in which information about product and service quality 
is available to consumers at a relatively low marginal cost. In this case, where 
substitute goods or services are readily available, where consumer transactions 
occur relatively frequently, where reputation effects are extremely salient to 
sellers and manufacturers, the threat of "exit" is likely to have dramatic and 
salutary effects on product and service quality. As well, this regulatory mech- 
anism does not need public institutions (other than those necessary to ensure 
competitive and efficient market places) to produce the behaviour we are 
attempting to generate. 
5 Of course, we assume that recovery is justified according to applicable substantive 
legal rules. This paper does not address redress problems associated with in- 
adequacies in the substantive consumer law which defines the legal entitlements 
of the parties to the transaction. 
6 The additional expenses and added risks of suing on a judgement are most 
significant where the defendant-seller is resident outside the jurisdiction where 
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consider the possibility of incurring legal expenses for advice both at 
the trial stage and in the legal process of forcing recovery on the jud- 
gement.7 
Besides this basic structural problem, other concerns and costs face 
consumers seeking legal redress8 Court and other costs associated 
with law suits can be significant, though these are usually payable by 
the defendant to the consumer as part of a court awarded recovery to 
the victorious consumer. In addition, significant delays are often as- 
sociated with legal procedures. Perhaps the most formidable obstacle 
for some consumers is their perception that courts are an alien, esoteric 
and unfriendly en~ironment.~ The procedural rules and symbolic over- 
tones of the courts, which may increase the legitimacy and majesty of 
the institution, contribute to this view. For these reasons, many have 
sought to reform the consumer redress process both by replacing tra- 
ditional legal institutions with a simplified, more user friendly, small 
claims court and by encouraging the use of non-legal, alternative dis- 
pute resolution me~hanisms.'~ 
Those who propose the reform of legal redress procedures through 
these alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have several distinct 
but related objectives.ll One objective is to reduce the government 
the original trial takes place. Where the defendant resides in the same province 
as the consumer-plaintiff, forcing payment on a judgement is more certain and 
much less expensive. 
7 The case of, Morguard v. Savoie, [I9901 3 S.C.R. 1077, has reduced the risks 
associated with suing on a judgement obtained in one province in another. This 
new legal doctrine may not, however, extend to small claims judgements. 
According to Uniform Law Conference, The E~forcenletzt of Judgements betweetz 
Canadian Provinces, (no. 64) 1989, and the work of the Law Reform Commission 
of British Columbia, The Report orz the Utziform Etforcement of Canadian 
Judgemerzts Act, 1992, small claims judgements need not have the same force and 
effect as judgements from other courts in inter-provincial circumstances. 
8 See P.D. Emond, ed., Commercial Dispute Resolution - AIternatives to Litigation, 
(Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 1989). 
9 This view of courts is based on anecdotal evidence, systematic studies of attitudes 
towards courts by their users have sometimes shown quite different results. See, 
for example, E. Allen Lind et. al., "In the Eyes of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' 
Evaluation of their Experience in the Civil Justice System" (1990) 24 L. & Soc. 
Rev. 953, which suggests that litigants in the courts in selected counties in 
Virginia, Maryland and Delaware had quite positive experiences with their legal 
system. 
10 These may include mediation, arbitration, "rent-a-judge" programs, summary 
jury trials and judicially administered mini-trials. See J.R. Allison, "Five Ways 
to Keep Disputes Out of Court" (1990) Ham. Bus. Rev. 166. 
1 1  For example, three associated organizations working to bring nonprofit alter- 
native dispute resolution methods to Ottawa-Carleton have similar motives. These 
are, The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution, Without Prejudice, and The 
Dispute Resolution Centre of Ottawa-Carleton. For a discussion of their views 
see G. Ejston, "What, No Lawyers?'(Jan-Feb 1988) Ottawa Busirzess Life, 6. 
See also J.R. Allison, supra note 10 at 167. Allison argues that the alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms share two characteristics: they are all attempts to 
save legal and managerial time and money, and they all try to take at least some 
of the edge off the adversarial attitude encouraged by courts. The theory behind 
alternative dispute resolution pursued by these organisations is that settling 
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costs associated with the public subsidization of the court system. Al- 
ternative dispute settlement techniques used within the court system 
probably achieve greater efficiency and might be expected to reduce 
the cost to government. It is not clear, however, if this type of reform 
of the courts actually reduces costs because, even if cases are disposed 
of more efficiently, greater use of the courts may be induced with 
associated higher costs. The details of this point are pursued further 
below. 
Another objective sought by proponents of alternative dispute reso- 
lution mechanisms is the reduction of the private costs of litigation 
faced by consumers and businesses. A reduction in the private costs 
of litigation helps to make redress more practical since the expenses 
associated with redress are reduced relative to the gain being sought. 
But there are other effects as well. The reduction in private costs as- 
sociated with undertaking redress should contribute, albeit in a small 
way, to what economists call transactional efficiency. This may con- 
tribute to national competitiveness by improving market efficiency. 
There is also the more immediate gain in marginally lower prices be- 
cause lower litigation costs can be factored into the price of various 
goods and services. 
Finally, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are attractive be- 
cause many perceive them to be less adversarial and more likely to 
result in voluntary settlements and reconciliation than traditional legal 
adjudication of disputes.12 The most important potential gain for many 
proponents of alternative dispute resolution is this hoped-for reduction 
in the intensity of private conflict. It is, perhaps, for this reason that 
many proponents of alternative dispute resolution feel very strongly 
about this approach to resolving disputes. Likewise, strong negative 
feelings towards the legal system of dispute resolution may be encoun- 
tered in proponents of alternative dispute resolution because of that 
system' s alleged propensity to create or engender adversarial relation- 
ships.13 
With such optimistic objectives, and in the face of the often striking 
unsuitability of ordinary courts for resolving small claims, it is not 
surprising that alternative dispute resolution has enjoyed considerable 
support among academics, government officials, some business lead- 
disputes as painlessly as possible requires good communication, that good 
communication requires some degree of trust, and that the adversary system of 
dispute resolution nurtures distrust, distortion, and animosity. Id. 
12 See, for example, C.A. McEwen & R.J. Maimam, "Small Claims mediation in 
Maine: An Empirical Assessment" (1981) 33 Maine L.Rev. 237 at 238 and 239. 
13 Most writers offer four discernible goals of alternative dispute resolution. First, 
alternative dispute resolution may relieve court congestion and undue cost and 
delay. Second, it may enhance community involvement in dispute resolution 
processes. Third, non-adjudicative processes, may, depending on the particular 
process under consideration, facilitate access to justice. Finally, alternative 
dispute resolution may provide more "effective" dispute resolution; "effective- 
ness" being defined as inexpensive, speedy, procedurally fair, and satisfying to 
both parties by leading to a final resolution of the dispute. See, S.B. Goldberg, 
E.D. Green & F.E.A. Sander, Dispute Resolution, (Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1985) at 5. 
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ers, and consumer activists. On the other hand, there are very few 
essential characteristics of courts which make them unsuitable for re- 
solving consumer disputes. The utility of any dispute resolution forum 
(whether it is legal in nature or not) for resolving disputes is a product 
of a relatively limited number of variables such as standing rules, the 
ability to bring collective or class actions, costs, the production of 
information, and so on. All are identifiable characteristics and many 
might be adopted to any dispute resolution system, including the 
courts. It is, therefore, possible to be a proponent of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques for resolving disputes and apply those approach- 
es to dispute resolution through the courts. 
While alternative dispute resolution is usually viewed as conceptu- 
ally distinct from traditional legal processes, even a cursory review of 
the operations of some courts suggests that the techniques and some- 
times the ideas which characterize alternative dispute resolution have 
frequently been adopted in small claims court rules and procedures.I4 
As well, informal transference of the alternative dispute resolution 
culture may be changing actual courtroom behaviour even without 
formal modification of court procedures and rules. There may, in fact, 
now be considerable overlap in practice between the way disputes are 
resolved in non-legal, alternative dispute resolution fora and in small 
claims courts. There is, however, relatively little evidence about whe- 
ther, or to what extent, courtroom practice may have begun to con- 
verge with alternative dispute resolution processes.I5 If the courts have 
begun to resemble something like alternative dispute resolution fora, 
the implications may be significant not only for the resolution of con- 
sumer complaints, but for understanding the development and future 
of the law at least in this context. As well, if the courts have begun to 
use alternative dispute resolution techniques, then it is worth consid- 
ering in what situations non-judicial dispute resolution might offer 
advantages, or conceivably disadvantages, in comparison to small 
claims courts.16 
Accordingly, one objective of this paper is to explore the practice of 
dispute resolution and settlement in consumer cases as it unfolds in 
14 Small claims courts often provide an opportunity (and sometimes require) 
litigants to mediate their dispute before aformal trial is begun with varying results. 
See, C.A. McEwen & R.J. Maiman, "Mediation in Small Claims Courts: 
Achieving Mediation through Consent" (1984) 18 Law & Society 11, which 
explores how the tendency to compliance is affected by the use of mediation as 
a technique in small claims courts and N. Vidmar, "An Assessment of Mediation 
in Small Claims Courts" (1985) 41 J.  of Social Issues 127. 
15 There is, however, a considerable literature on the operation and attitudes of users 
towards small claims courts. For example, see G.W. Adams, "The Small Claims 
Court and the Adversary Process More Problems of Function and Forum" (1973) 
5 1 Can. Bar Rev. 583; K .  Hildebrandt et. al., "The Windsor Small Claims Court: 
An Empirical Study of Plaintiffs and their Attitudes" (1982) 2 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 87, and N .  Vidmar, "Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of 
Disputes and an Empirical Examination" (1984) 18 Law & Society Rev. 515. 
16 This issue is explored, though from a somewhat different perspective, by N. 
Vidmar, "Assessing the Effects of Case Characteristics and Settlement Forum on 
Dispute Outcomes and Compliance" (1987) 21 Law & Society Rev. at 155. 
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small claims court and in various types of non-legal alternative dispute 
resolution fora. By necessity, this exploration is based upon selected 
and limited observations of both types of fora. These observations are 
supplemented by discussions with small claims court judges and pri- 
vate (non-lawyer) practitioners of alternative dispute resolution. 
These observations and discussions provide some initial indication of 
the degree to which, and perhaps how, convergence in behaviour in the 
two types of fora may have begun to take place. The second objective 
of the paper is to use the insights gained about the actual practices used 
in small claims court and in alternative dispute resolution fora as the 
basis for refining consumer redress processes in each forum. 
The paper is organised to facilitate these twin objectives. In Section 
2, we briefly outline and review various theories and approaches to 
mediation, arbitration and judicial dispute adjudication which have 
been articulated in the literature on dispute resolution with a focus on 
consumer transactions. In Section 3, we discuss the approach taken to 
field observations including discussions with practitioners, observa- 
tions of non-judicial alternative dispute resolution in several fora and 
observations of small claims courts. Section 4 provides a discussion 
of this field research that is organised to compare theories and assump- 
tions with observed practice of dispute resolution in small claims court 
and in several alternative dispute resolution fora. Finally, in Section 
5, the salient conclusions are discussed. This last section also offers a 
number of recommendations aimed at improving the efficiency, avail- 
ability and fairness of consumer redress in both non-judicial altema- 
tive dispute resolution and small claims court procedures. 
2. Theory 
The popular image of court adjudication is both narrow and ex- 
tremely critical. The courts are seen to be confined to a formal and 
adversarial presentation of evidence and argument before an imposed 
third party (a judge), who interferes very little with the way in which 
the disputants choose to present their case. There are further signifi- 
cant concerns with regard to costs, delays, and the exacerbation of the 
already existing disputes by the adversary system. Access to justice is 
limited by a legal system which demands time, money and knowledge; 
resources that many people do not have.17 Critics argue that the courts 
have become overburdened as the public has turned to them in increasing 
numbers to resolve disputes that were long considered non-justiciable. 
Indeed, courts have been expected to fill the void left by the decline of 
other dispute-resolving bodies, such as the church, the family and the 
comrnunity.l8 It is no wonder that many seek an alternative to the law. 
The phrase "alternative dispute resolution" is sometimes used to 
refer simply to the use of mechanisms for resolving disputes that do 
not involve recourse to the formal legal system, through institutions 
such as the church, family hierarchy, and informal community sanc- 
tions. These alternatives to the formal legal system have a long and 
17 L. Nader, "Disputing Without the Force of Law" (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 998 at 999. 
18 Chief Justice W. Burger, "Isn't There a Better Way?'(l982) 68 Am. Bar Assoc. 
J .  274. 
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ancient heritage. Indeed, there is no recourse to formal, state-sanc- 
tioned legal systems in most customary law situations. For example, 
in many traditional societies, elders, religious leaders or others resolve 
disputes without the use of law or law courts as we understand them.l9 
Similarly, non-legal forms of dispute adjudication are encountered in 
many aspects of life in our society which are considered "private" and 
thus inappropriate for the publicity associated with state legality.20 
Modem alternative dispute resolution theorists, however, approach 
the idea of non-legal dispute resolution from quite a different perspec- 
tive. 
Modern alternative dispute resolution theories are often charac- 
terized by a self-conscious criticism of the legal system and by a de- 
liberate determination to overcome many of its manifest  problem^.^' 
Most proponents of alternative dispute resolution believe that institu- 
tional characteristics of the legal system in the late twentieth century 
serve to exacerbate misunderstandings that arise in the normal course 
of commerce and day-to-day living.22 These critics of the law usually 
make an implicit assumption that the offensive characteristics of the 
legal system are either inherent or structural. Consequently, most seek 
to circumvent the legal approach almost in its entirety rather than to 
change it. 
One needs to compare and contrast the characteristics of alternative 
dispute resolution and court adjudication in order to uncover the basis 
for the criticism levied by these critics of the legal system. It is difficult 
to define these two processes precisely, but there are several charac- 
teristics which are commonly accepted as representing significant 
contrasting positions of the two systems. First, while disputant partici- 
pation in adjudication is involuntary and the outcome is binding 
though subject to appeal, participation in the majority of alternative 
dispute resolution processes is voluntary. Participation in alternative 
19 Many primitive societies had legal systems which operated without adjudication 
or formal sanctions. In fact, many rules in our own society are upheld without 
recourse to ordinary legal machinery or the use of sanctions. International law, 
too, often operates without recourse to formal adjudication and sometimes 
without sanctions. Sees. Roberts, OrderandDispute (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1979) at 80-99 and 1 15- 136 on dispute resolution in primitive societies and R.C. 
Ellickson, Order Without Law (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991) at 40-64 
on modern dispute resolution without law or any formal processes whatever. 
20 See generally, G.A. Weissmann & C.M. Lieck, "Mediation and Other Creative 
Alternatives to Litigating Family Law Issues" (1985) 61 N. Dak. L. Rev. 263; I.R. 
Scott, "The Reform of Matrimonial Causes Procedure" (1 986) 5 Civ. J~cstice Qtly. 
8, and L.E. Teitelbaum & L. DuPaix, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law" (1988) 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 
1093. 
21 See E.G. Tannis, Altentate Dispute Resollctiort That Works (North York: Captus 
Press, 1989); J.R. Allison, supra note 10; G .  Easton, supra note I I .  
22 Since most of the theorists are American, i t  may be fair to suggest that their view 
of law is based on a common law model of adjudication. This suggestion is 
strengthened by the fact that many of the legal approaches whichdraw the harshest 
- - -  
of criticism from these authors - such as the requirement for consideration in 
contract - are common law approaches derived from a philosophical premise 
that in many cases carefully limits enforceable legal relationships. 
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dispute resolution is compulsory when the parties bind themselves to 
engage in this form of dispute resolution as part of a valid contract. 
The outcome of alternative dispute resolution may or may not be bind- 
ing, depending on the process used, but where it is binding, as in com- 
mercial arbitration, enforcement of the award may have to be sought 
through a separate action based on contract law.23 
Second, decision-makers in adjudicative processes are usually both 
neutral third parties and generalists - that is, they will not have any 
expertise in the subject matter of the dispute. The decision-maker ren- 
ders a principled decision, supported by reasoned opinion, which usu- 
ally represents a zero-sum outcome. In contrast, alternative dispute 
resolution processes allow the disputants to select a decision-maker 
acceptable to both sides, permitting a decision made by one who may 
well have expertise in the area and, thus, be more suitable to the dispute 
than a state-imposed judge. The decision rendered by such a third party 
may allow for compromise and balance the interests of both parties 
thus assisting them to reach a mutually acceptable solution. 
Third, the format in adjudication is usually formalized and highly 
structured, and rules of evidence and fact-finding may present a par- 
ticular and restricted set of facts on which decisions are based. On the 
other hand, procedural rules in alternative dispute resolution may be set 
by the parties and are usually informal and flexible. This allows for pres- 
entation of any arguments, evidence or interests that assist in designing a 
solution to conflict, within the framework agreed upon by the disputants. 
Finally, the range of possible decisions or resolutions for a dispute 
is usually more limited in small claims court or other courts of law than 
in alternative dispute resolution fora. Small claims courts do, however, 
sometimes exercise some imagination in fashioning outcomes but they 
are often limited by formal legal requirements or expectations. 
Because of the differences between the two processes, theorists 
have articulated several criteria for choosing which process is more 
suited to the dispute.24 Choosing between adjudication and alternative 
dispute resolution involves a close examination of the relationship 
between the disputants. An on-going relationship may suggest a proc- 
23 Many systems of arbitration depend for enforcement on a pre-existing legal 
contract binding the participants to the results of the arbitration. Failure to pay 
the arbitration award is a breach of contract which then can be sued on in an 
ordinary law court. Some jurisdictions have also passed legislation that makes the 
result of a formal arbitration immediately convertible to a judgement. See for, 
example, in Quebec Art. 946 C.C.P. While this is effective within the jurisdiction 
that passed the legislation, it raises questions about how other jurisdictions will 
treat the award if it were necessary to seek satisfaction outside the jurisdiction 
where the award was made. In other words, it is not clear whether full, faith and 
credit extends to such awards. In Canada, it is likely that consumer arbitration 
awards may not be legally effective outside the jurisdiction where they are made 
because there is even some doubt whether small claims judgements from courts 
will be recognised by sister provincial courts. See P. Finkle & C. Labrecque, "Low 
Cost Legal Remedies and Market Efficiency: Looking Beyond Morguard (1993) 
22 Can. Bus. L.J. 58, and the Proceedings of the National Consumer and 
Commercial Law Conference, 1992. 
24 See S.B. Goldberg, E.D. Green & F.E.A. Sander, supra note 13 at 1 1 .  
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ess which is conciliatory and a solution that is mutually acceptable, 
rather than allowing one party to obtain all of the benefits of a "winner 
take all" outcome usually associated with traditional legal adjudica- 
tion. A significant imbalance in the power of the disputants may re- 
quire a forum where principle, not power, determines the outcome; in 
such circumstances a court may be the most appropriate forum. But 
the assured access to courts for parties of unequal power could itself 
shape opportunities for satisfactory settlement without the exercise of 
legal authority." 
The nature of the dispute is also an important aspect of choosing 
between adjudication and alternative processes. Alternative dispute 
resolution tends to suit "polycentric" problems involving resource al- 
location issues presenting no clear governing guidelines. Adjudication 
can provide needed authority for critical life-and-death problems 
where precedent may be important. Recurring, simpler problems that 
do not need a definitive precedent set by the courts may be more easily 
solved by alternative dispute resolution. In practice, however, it is 
often difficult to categorise disputes by their nature. 
Finally, time and cost may play a role in deciding whether to resort 
to the courts or some other method of resolving the dispute. While the 
data (including information generated for this study) is inconclusive, 
most writers take the position that alternative dispute resolution is 
likely to involve less time, although private costs may, in fact, be high- 
er than in state subsidized adjudication. 
The central premise for many theorists is that the most important 
barrier to resolving disputes is a failure of communication between 
the parties.26 This failure arises from a lack of trust that is partly a 
consequence of the nature of the economic system and partly a result 
of the acculturation of the legal system. Accordingly, alternative dis- 
pute resolution is premised on the hypothesis that if the parties could 
overcome this distrust, they could voluntarily reach a settlement which 
would be perceived to be as legitimate as a court imposed decision. In 
most situations, a voluntary resolution or settlement of a dispute is 
usually seen as the most desirable result for the parties and as a success 
for the third party, mediator. Indeed, voluntary settlement is the goal 
to which alternative dispute resolution aspires.27 Nevertheless, arbi- 
tration, which is an involuntary non-legal resolving of a dispute, re- 
mains a part of most models of alternative dispute resolution. 
Assuming that an increase in voluntary settlements can be obtained 
as communication and trust is generated or regenerated between the 
25 L. Nader, supra note 17 at 1020. 
26 E.G. Tannis, supra note 21. 
27 This particular aspect of alternative dispute resolution theory is described by J.K. 
Lieberman & J.F. Henry, in "Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement" (1986) 53 U. Chicago L. Rev. 424 at 427. Ln our observations of 
alternative dispute resolution practice at the Better Business Bureaus of Toronto 
and Buffalo, we noted that the most important question asked by supervising 
administrators from the Bureaus after a mediation\arbitration hearing was: "Did 
the parties agree?"at was clearly the test of a successful hearing, though if the 
hearing went to arbitration that outcome was also considered legitimate, albeit 
unfortunate. 
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parties, it follows that the most condemnatory aspects of the legal ad- 
judication of disputes are those which inhibit communication. Criti- 
cism of the legal system must, however, focus at and after that point in 
time when a consumer perceives that the expected benefits of a trans- 
action are not present. That is where a problem is first noted and that 
is where the legal system begins to interfere with comm~nications.~~ 
Typical judicial processes may inhibit communication and trust because 
they provide virtually no rules for negotiating a voluntary settlement 
prior to formal adjudication (which is, ordinarily, very carefully struc- 
t ~ r e d ) . ~ ~  This lacunae in the legal system can result in extremely costly 
and often unproductive strategic bargaining by the parties or their ad- 
visors. In fact, often the parties engage in no communications at all.30 
The prospect of facing litigation can also poison communications. Li- 
tigation has been described as "accentuating hositility, not trust".31 It 
is said to support competitive aggression to the exclusion of reciproc- 
ity and empathy and may encourage hiding the truth by dissembling. 
In sum, "The adversary process is expensive . . . time-consuming [and 
it] often leaves a trail of stress and fru~tration."~~ 
Alternative dispute resolution techniques and processes are far 
more systematic in their approach to enhancing communication and 
thus in resolving disputes prior to formal hearings than are conven- 
tional legal settlement negotiations. These alternative dispute resolu- 
tion processes may permit realistic assessments of whether offers and 
counter offers are made in good faith and can enhance communica- 
tions between the parties.33 
As well, communication-induced settlements are discouraged in a 
legal adjudicative system which is characterized by a "winner-take- 
all" approach.34 Legal liability is most often resolved by deciding the 
case either for the plaintiff or the defendant. Many models of altema- 
28 Id. at 429. 
29 P.D. Emond, supra note 8. 
30 Bargaining in the litigation context can be conceived of as negotiating in a 
bilaterally monopolistic setting. There is considerable evidence that bargaining 
between monopolists and monopsonists - typified by negotiations in the labour 
relations context - is very costly. In the typical consumer litigation setting the 
parties are bargaining over "the right to sue for breach of contract". The consumer 
owns this right and is in effect offering to sell it to the supplier at a price (the 
settlement figure). The bargaining is problematical because the consumer need 
not disclose his reservation price, and there is no "market" in this entitlement to 
which the parties can refer to ascertain either the.fair or efficient price. As well, 
the consumer can only sell the right to the seller. Similarly, the seller can only 
buy the right from this particular consumer, need not disclose the highest price 
he is willing to pay, and again there is no market to turn to for independent 
assessment for the value of the right. In this context, both parties will simply begin 
the negotiations by declaring extreme starting positions, and spend valuable time 
and energy coming to a position somewhere in the middle. 
31 J. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983) at 
14-15. 
32 Chief Justice Warren Burger, supra note 18 at 275. 
33 J.K. Lieberman & J.F. Henry, supra note 27 at 429. 
34 See C. Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving" (1984) 3 1 UCLA L. Rev. 754 at 783-89. 
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tive dispute resolution, by contrast, are not committed to the zero-sum 
game of adjudication. The parties have an incentive to negotiate open- 
ly in a search of wealth-creating rather than wealth-redistributing so- 
lutions. Those solutions may be far more novel and productive than 
the usual damage or injunctive remedies typically provided by judges. 
Another aspect of the law that alternative dispute resolution theo- 
rists believe militates against effective dispute resolution is the fact- 
finding system used by the courts.35 Judges are unlikely to be experts 
in the area under adjudication. Indeed, the common law system, with 
a few exceptions, is designed to be a system for generalists. This has 
certain dysfunctional consequences for legal dispute resolution. The 
generalist-judge must be educated to the complexities of the case by 
appropriate testimony introduced through an adversarial process with 
all of the costs concomitant to that system. Rules of evidence and 
traditional procedures may interfere with the ability of judges to gain 
an understanding of the crucial facts of a case, and may inhibit the 
parties from discussing matters that the law defines as irrelevant. If 
central questions of fact leading to the dispute are not raised by the 
parties or are considered to be legally irrelevant, the traditional passive 
role of the judge may leave them wholly unaddressed. 
These typical institutional characteristics of courts that determine 
how judges act can be contrasted with the expected behaviour of the 
neutral third party in many alternative dispute resolution processes. 
The parties, themselves, may select a mutually acceptabl'e neutral 
third party, sometimes choosing one with expertise in the subject area 
that is the focus of the dispute. This reduces the public and private 
costs of educating the fact-finder and may reduce the risk of a 
"wrong" finding of fact. Moreover, if the parties have personally and 
directly participated in selecting the neutral third party, they may be 
psychologically disposed to accept that person's binding determina- 
tion of the outcome of the dispute; more easily accede to non-binding 
settlement proposals, or agree to implement advisory opinions.36 In 
some sense, it is not surprising that many alternative dispute resolu- 
tion methodologies would appear to be functionally superior to the 
legal system in promoting voluntary settlement; that above all is their 
raison d'etre. 
Nevertheless, even knowledgeable disputants often choose to go to 
court instead of engaging in alternative dispute resolution. Judicial 
procedures, with all of their attendant costs, may be perceived as fairer. 
The parties may want rule articulation, not just a solution to their im- 
mediate pr~blem. '~ Critics of alternative dispute resolution, led by 
Owen Fiss, believe that it should be seen as a highly problematic tech- 
nique for streamlining dockets: "Like plea bargaining, settlement is a 
capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither 
35 See Bureau of National Affairs, Resolvirtg Disputes Witlwut Litigation 
(Washington: Bureau of National Affairs Inc., 1985). 
36 J.K. Lieberman & J.R. Henry, supra note 27 at 430-431. 
37 However, it has been argued that this function is in lawyers' professional interests, 
rather than in the interest of the litigants. SeeO. Fiss, "Against Settlement"(1984) 
93 Yale L.J. 1073 at 1084. 
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encouraged nor praised".38 Extra-judicial settlements may be espe- 
cially problematic where the parties' relationships are characterized 
by significant power imbalances. 
In consumer disputes, it is rare to find an equality of bargaining 
power between the disputants. One, usually the consumer, has fewer 
resources (or less incentive to deploy adequate resources) and may be 
forced to accept a settlement from the more powerful party that 
would be less than an award made by a court. Indeed, there is a con- 
cern over the possibility of the development of a "two-track" justice 
system that "dispenses informal justice to poor people with 'small' 
claims, who cannot afford legal services and who are denied access 
to the courts",39 while allowing formal justice to be used to address 
the problems of those wealthy disputants who can afford to litigate. It 
is possible that alternative dispute resolution may make judicial in- 
volvement, which might otherwise be used to address these systemic 
biases, extremely problematic. Finally, alternative processes may in- 
hibit courts from taking adequate account of the problems posed by 
small claimants in the interpretation of legislation and the development 
of the common law. 
The law, in many cases, has the function not only of resolving dis- 
putes between the parties but also of creating rules for all of society 
and resolving disputes in ways that reinforce certain societal values 
for everyone. Regardless of how alternative dispute mechanisms are 
strengthened, "their case-by case approach cannot remedy all the 
harms ... it does not contribute to the identification of widespread 
problems or to the prevention of future  dispute^."^^ All courts, includ- 
ing those that are only concerned with small claims, play an important 
role in affirming vital societal values such as equality before the law 
and procedural fairness. All courts also have a role in educating society 
about substantive societal rules. Appellate courts are often engaged in 
producing rules which affect all of society, not just the parties, while 
trial courts give meaning to those rules through their decisions in par- 
ticular cases immediately before them. 
Certainly, alternative dispute resolution may reduce private costs 
and the publicity and delay of a public trial. However, i t  also ends the 
symbolic drama of a trial and eliminates the educational impact of a 
public proceeding which raises fundamental public policy issues. Cru- 
cial public policy issues related to the dispute itself, and the reasoning 
which lead to a determination of the outcome, are almost never pub- 
licly aired in a non-judicial forum using alternative dispute resolution 
techniques. This is, in part, because such deliberations are always re- 
stricted to the parties and, in part, because the forum permits the parties 
to restrict themselves to maximizing their private interests. 
Since the parties to a dispute are usually concerned solely with their 
immediate costs and outcomes, they usually have little or no interest in 
the societal functions performed by the legal system. Courts, when ad- 
dressing individual cases, often publicly address important legal and 
38 Id. at 1075. 
39 Id. at 1076. 
40 L. Nader, sltprn note 17 at 1020. 
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policy issues, and practical lessons for society are learned from the 
experience of the litigants. When acting in this way, the courts and 
law create the background environment or ultimate default rules which 
provide the context and, perhaps, the threat which can prompt settle- 
ment through alternative dispute resolution or other mechanisms. The 
law is, in effect, concerned with producing certain public goods - 
legal rules and information about products and services - which are 
by definition valuable for all, but which, in practice, are under-pro- 
duced by the immediate disputants in alternative dispute resolution 
proce~ses.~' 
While non-judicial dispute resolution expresses and embodies cer- 
tain general values, these are usually unrelated to the outcome of the 
dispute. They involve, instead, the value of non-confrontational recon- 
ciliation and open communications. It would be almost impossible for 
these non-judicial procedures to address public issues because one or 
both of the parties probably selected alternative dispute resolution pre- 
cisely to avoid setting public precedents, to reduce adverse reputational 
effects, or to inhibit public and governmental discussion of an issue. 
Critics of alternative dispute resolution generally emphasize the 
public functions of the law when they suggest that settlement between 
the parties on terms they think appropriate may not be the best outcome 
for society as a whole. Proponents of non-judicial dispute resolution, 
on the other hand, often focus on cost savings to the parties and the 
promotion of general values associated with that system. Both critics 
and proponents of alternative dispute resolution, like critics and sup- 
porters of the law, generally write from a fairly abstract and theoretical 
perspective. In practice, the legal system, often led by small claims 
courts, have adopted many of the techniques and assumptions of al- 
ternative dispute resolution while retaining a formal legal structure 
and methodology. There may also be increased recognition by propo- 
nents of alternative dispute resolution that it can only operate against 
a "background" of cultural values, including law, which provide 
meaning to notions of right and wrong and that define, so to speak, 
when a dispute exists. 
In summary, many lawyers and judges have given, perhaps, inade- 
quate attention to the practical difficulties involved in obtaining legal 
redress, especially of small claims. Similarly, the legal system has 
probably given insufficient attention to the value to the parties (if not 
always to society) of voluntary settlement. Predictably, when the costs 
and time associated with redress in the courts is perceived as too bur- 
densome in comparison with the expected gains from redress, a de- 
mand for an improved system of dispute resolution is created that may 
be fulfilled outside that institution. Part of the response to that demand 
is the growth of and interest in non-judicial alternative dispute reso- 
lution. On the other hand, many proponents of non-judicial alternative 
dispute resolution may have overlooked the capacity and willingness 
of the legal system to "compete" by embracing alternative dispute 
41 A public good is similar to a public property resource and, as such, is not usually 
valued by individuals. See, for example, J .  Crutchfield, "Common Property 
Resources and Factor Allocation" (1956) 22 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sc. 292. 
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resolution techniques and, to a lesser extent, by adopting its goal of 
voluntarily settlement to dispute adjudication in the courts. 
The result is the development of what initially appears to be two 
quite separate dispute resolution systems - one with its venue in the 
courts and the other located in the private sector. The question we 
address in the following sections is the degree to which these systems 
are in reality distinct. Our concern is that a false dichotomy between 
alternative dispute resolution and traditional judicial institutions may 
bedepicted in the literature which is not only inaccurate but may retard 
the development of both dispute resolution approaches. To verify this 
impression, we attempted to observe several elements of the institu- 
tional behaviour of both systems in operation, in order to draw com- 
parisons between and among them. But making useful and meaningful 
comparative observations of alternative dispute resolution systems 
and the courts is much easier said than done. 
3. Field Research: Methods and Objectives 
In this and the following sections we attempt to determine how the 
abstract theories about legal and alternative dispute resolution proc- 
esses outlined above manifest themselves in typical consumer dispute 
resolution processes now operating in Canada and the United States.42 
This section is focused on methods, objectives and, unfortunately, li- 
mitations. An initial problem in attempting to understand current prac- 
tices is that it is extremely difficult to observe more than a very limited 
number of situations which may or may not accurately reflect a much 
wider current reality. It is possible, in theory, and sometimes in prac- 
tice, to overcome this limitation by the careful selection of a repre- 
sentative sample of reality. But it was not possible in making these 
types of observations of alternative dispute resolution in the context 
of consumer complaints, to even know what a representative sample 
might consist of. 
Because our field observations are not statistically significant and 
because there were only a limited number of observations compared 
to the actual number of situations which might have been investigated, 
this research can do no more than be suggestive of the nature of current 
42 For the purposes of this study, we employed terminology developed and defined 
by Professor Andrew Pirie of the Dispute Resolution Centre, Faculty of Law, 
University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. Professor Pirie defines "mediation" as the 
intervention of an impartial and neutral third party, who has no decision making 
power, into a dispute or negotiation to assist and facilitate contending parties in 
voluntarily arriving at a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute. See 
A.J.. Pirie, Dispute Resolution irz Canada: Present State, Future Directiorl 
(Victoria: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987) at 6-7. He defines 
"arbitration" as a dispute resolution process in which the disputants present 
evidence and arguments to a neutral third party who has the contractual or 
statutory authority to make a decision which is binding on the parties. In general, 
an arbitrator's decision is based on the application of rules to a set of facts. Finally, 
the Small Claims Court is defined as a dispute resolution process in an adversarial 
setting in which a legally binding decision is rendered by a judge based on 
consideration of evidence and application of law to facts. See also, for other 
somewhat different definitions, J.R. Allison, supra note 10. 
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practices. The research can, however, provide a focus for a further, 
more statistically valid, analysis of judicial and alternative dispute re- 
solution processes in the consumer context. It can also provide some 
suggestion of the nature of the reality which we are seeking to under- 
stand, even though our conclusions must be taken as heuristic and 
unproven. The field research on which this study is based involved 
observing dispute resolution in small claims c0urts,4~ and in a number 
of alternative dispute resolution f ~ r a . ~ ~  
While there was no possibility of being statistically rigorous, an 
attempt was made to make observations which were comparatively 
meaningful by focusing on a limited number of questions which the 
literature suggested would be relevant in determining the effective 
character of proceedings in legal and alternative dispute resolution 
processes. These questions helped to structure observations of the 
three classical dispute resolution processes (mediation, non-judicial 
arbitration, and legal decision-making in the courts). They also helped 
in posing questions to officials where observations were limited. No 
attempt was made to quantify or statistically validate observations 
since they were too few in numbers and not selective enough to war- ' 
rant that effort. 
The results of our observations are presented in the following sec- 
tion in an impressionistic form in order to avoid artificially lending 
them more quantitative meaning than they warrant. Whatever rigor 
43 Research assistants undertook some 100 observations in the small claims courts 
of Ottawa, Ontario and Hull, Quebec. Field research was limited to these courts 
because they were easily accessible and resource constraints prevented us from 
observing courts in more distant or diverse locales. We should note that the typical 
small claims court, though clearly not a totally "consumer friendly' environment, 
does differ from superior courts. The "people's court" as it is often described, 
provides an effective opportunity for individuals to represent themselves and tell 
their story in a formal court of law often without legal representation. In fact, in 
Quebec, procedural rules prevent the use of counsel. See in Quebec Art. 955 
C.C.P. Evidentiary rules in Ontario are in theory less restrictive than in superior 
court. In practice, such rules are even less restrictive than they appear on paper 
though oaths are used and legal relevancy, albeit relaxed, still defines what 
evidence or testimony may be heard. See, in Ontario, Courtsof Justice Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c.43, s.27; in Quebec, Art. 973 C.C.P. and in British Columbia, Small 
Clnin~s Court Act, S.B.C. 1989, c.38, s.16. The formal definition of the 
jurisdiction of small claims courts necessarily includes a monetary sum which 
sets a limit on the amount of money a plaintiff may claim in small claims court 
proceedings. See irlfra note 72. 
44 Non-judicial alternative dispute resolution "hearings" undertaken by the Better 
Business Bureaus of Toronto and Buffalo and by the Ontario Motor Vehicle 
Arbitration Plan (OMVAP) in Ottawa were studied partially through observation 
but mainly by discussions with officials of those organisations. The alternative 
dispute resolution procedures used by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada 
to resolve disputes over gas and electric bills caused by inaccurate meters or 
variances in prices were examined through discussions with officials. Direct 
observation of alternative dispute resolution in action is difficult because the 
parties often choose a non-judicial forum in order to gain privacy and because in 
some locations quite few consumer cases are brought to formal mediation or 
arbitration. 
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there is in our field research results from carefully asking the same 
questions to facilitate comparisons and to structure our observations. 
These questions address eight variables: 
the formal designation of dispute resolution process; 
the formal legal categorisation of the claim (even if it were 
brought in a non-legal forum); 
the substantive nature of the dispute (that is, whether the 
consumer complaint involved inadequate product or service 
quality or performance; or involved the interpretation of legal 
rights in light of contractual terms or legislative standards); 
the degree and nature of third party intervention in resolving 
the dispute; 
the manner in which facts were ascertained in the dispute 
resolution process; 
the allocations of legal burdens of proof, if applicable; 
the remedial order or other outcome of the dispute; and 
the private and social costs of the dispute resolution process. 
Disputes were classified according to the formal designation of the 
dispute resolution proce~s,"~ the formal legal categorization of the 
and the substantive nature of the dispute. In the last case, the 
question attempted to determine if the consumer complaint involved 
technical information about product or service performance or quality 
or, alternatively, whether the dispute involved disagreement about the 
way negotiations were conducted or the terms of the contract.47 These 
criteria allowed us to make a determination of the type of claims and 
disputes that are being heard in the various dispute resolution fora. The 
amount of redress sought was ignored except that it was in every case 
small enough to allow use of small claims courts. 
Several questions were helpful in considering differences in the pro- 
cess of dispute resolution. An important question which we attempted 
to investigate in this study was the degree to which the judge or third 
45 This is referred to as "Approach Taken". Here we simply described which dispute 
mechanism the plaintiff decided to use. If small claims court was chosen, we then 
assessed whether the particular small claims court employed traditional superior 
court processes; and if a pre-trial or diversion mediation or arbitration service was 
offered. If there was an arbitration or mediation hearing, we then assessed whether 
the arbitrationlmediation was a claim-specific service operated by a non- 
governmental organization; a general service operated by a non-governmental 
organization; or a general service provided by the state. 
46 This was referred to as "Type of Claim". In general, consumer disputes will be 
framed as contractual disputes, disputes involving tort claims, or as disputes 
arising from the contravention of a legislatively imposed duty. 
47 This we labelled "What is the Dispute About?". Experience with consumer 
complaints suggest that many consumer disputes involve differing interpretations 
of the contractual obligations of the parties. Another large set involve dis- 
agreements as to whether the seller, in fact, supplied goods or services in 
compliance with those contractual obligations. Finally, a number of disputes 
initiated by commercial interests, as well as counter-claims, involve allegations 
of non-payment by the consumer. 
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party intervened in the dispute resolution process, and the nature of 
that intervention. To assess this, we considered the degree to which 
the third party controlled or influenced the evidence being presented, 
engaged in questioning witnesses, and assisted the parties in under- 
standing each other. 
An associated issue which we attempted to explore involved how 
facts are determined in various alternative dispute resolution proc- 
esses. Here we attempted to ascertain how evidence is introduced by 
the parties, including the use of hearsay evidence and the swearing or 
affirming of witnesses. In particular, we attempted to ascertain whe- 
ther the process required each party to prove the facts helshe alleged; 
or alternatively, whether the decision-maker played an active role in 
ascertaining the factual background of the dispute.48 
A further important variable which we attempted to explore was the 
manner in which disputes were finally resolved. Our major concern 
here was to try to ascertain whether the resolution was framed in au- 
thoritative or consensual terms. We also tried to determine how the 
third party purported to explain his or her decision. In this context, we 
were curious about whether reconciliation between the parties was an 
aspect of the resolution of a dispute, and we tried to determine if 
"awards" resulting from a process were actually transferred from one 
person to another. 
Finally, we were concerned about the costs (including time) of the 
different processes. This prompted us to gather information on the 
time which had elapsed from the date of the consumer's claim to the 
actual hearing date, and subsequently to the ultimate disposition of the 
dispute. We also tried to ascertain the cost of redress measured by 
court costs, and professional fees if legal or para-legal assistance was 
retained.49 
There are inevitable methodological problems in studying the con- 
crete reality associated with legal and non-legal dispute resolution. 
Indeed, such studies could not be carried forward if researchers are 
constrained by a requirement to use only the best methodology. In this 
case, as in many others, too much dedication to the best can be the 
enemy of attaining the 
48 A related question involved the burdens of proof required in the different dispute 
resolution processes. In this context, we were surprised to note that it was 
sometimes difficult to determine what that burden was or who carried it. 
49 The use of these eight variables not only helped to structure observations of the 
actual behaviour of small claims court and the practice of alternative dispute 
resolution in the private sector, but allowed others to understa'nd the perspective 
which we brought to this field research. It may also encourage others to undertake 
similar work using the same or comparable points of reference so that the resulting 
finds might be compared. Finally, we are deliberately open about our methods 
because despite its methodological limitations, this study is an attempt to meld 
often abstract legal research with the study of practical reality. 
50 This paraphrases Voltaire's famous quotation, "The best is the enemy of the 
good". See J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 15th ed., (Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1980) at 343. 
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4. Field Observations 
i) Typologies of Consumer Disputes Legal: 
Two distinct types of breach of contract cases were observed. In 
one, the goods or services which a buyer received failed to meet the 
explicit terms described in a sales or service agreement. For example, 
the seller may have expressly warranted that the goods would function 
adequately for six months and, subsequently, the goods proved defec- 
tive in some way before that time. Or, to take another example, the 
delivered goods were supposed to be white and, when received, were 
yellow. 
A second type of observed breach of contract was much less clear. 
This involves situations where the written agreement allegedly did not 
encompass all the terms which the consumer believed comprised the 
terms of the sale or service agreement. A common problem we ob- 
served consisted of disputes about terms which were not explicitly 
written into a sales agreement but which were allegedly agreed to 
orally during negotiations prior to the sale. Sometimes there was no 
written agreement at all. Another unclear situation is where terms were 
assumed to be part of the agreement but were not expressly mentioned 
by either party. For example, holes appeared in fabric after six months 
of light use. Holes are not mentioned in the original sales agreement 
and were not discussed explicitly by the parties. 
In order to avoid disagreements about such implicit assumptions, 
courts or the legislatures often make certain assumptions a part of all 
contracts by imposing a few specific terms on all sales agreements 
whether the buyer or seller mention them or not.5' Often these terms 
may not be avoided and apply even if the parties purport to agree that 
they shall not apply. Many of these unclear contract disputes involve 
the applicability and specifications of these legally imposed terms of 
contract. 
Evidentiary : 
Aside from classifying disputes into legal categories, most could 
also be further (and more usefully classified) on the basis of the type 
of evidentiary issues raised. In other words, it is possible to classify 
the disputes we observed on the basis of the central question of fact at 
issue in the dispute. One type of dispute involved questions of fact 
related to the product (or service) itself. In these situations, the dispute 
between the parties turned on a disagreement about the state of the 
product or service. In many of these type of cases, if the parties could 
agree about what was wrong with the product or service and\or why 
the problem occurred, then they could rapidly resolve their dispute. In 
these situations, which we call technical cases, the terms of the con- 
tract are not in dispute. The issue is whether the problem complained 
of by the consumer actually occurred; why it occurred; and what can 
be done about it. Technical cases focus on the product or the results 
of the service and can often be relatively easily resolved if the parties 
51 See generally, M.G. Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988). 
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could come to agreement about what went wrong. In one case we 
observed, for example, three months after installation, a linoleum floor 
began to develop small pin holes over a wide section of its surface. 
The seller believed the flooring was subject to abuse. The buyer be- 
lieved the flooring or its installation was defective. The resolution of 
this dispute was facilitated by an arbitration process in which a single 
expert, agreeable to both sides, provided an answer to the technical 
problem at issue. 
A second evidentiary type of consumer dispute which we observed 
was composed of situations where the parties disagreed as to the legal 
obligations associated with the transaction. The central evidentiary 
issue in these disputes is the existence and definition of the contractual 
or statutory obligations entered into by buyer and seller. Disputes of 
this sort, which we term legal cases, involve questions of agency to 
determine the authority of employees to bind the firm; the admissibil- 
ity and relevance of informal communications; determinations of con- 
tractual intention and interpretation in the face of ambiguous contrac- 
tual language; consent where unusual terms are not particularly 
disclosed by the firm to the consumer; the existence and applicability 
of legislation imposing tort liability; special terms of contract and trade 
practices on the parties; issues of privity of contract in the case of 
manufacturer/consumer disputes, and so on. Here, the resolution of 
the dispute depends on the existence and definition of one or more 
legal obligations. 
The two types of evidentiary disputes sometimes seem intimately 
related especially in situations where reduced payment or no payment 
is made by the buyer because the product did not meet expectations. 
But, in fact, in these situations the original terms of payment are not 
really in dispute, rather the aggrieved consumer is saying, in effect: If 
I had known that the product or service would have been delivered in 
this way, then I would only have agreed to pay this lesser amount or 
would not have entered into the sales agreement at all. 
In sum, observed cases could be classified in legal terms or on the 
basis of the evidentiary issue that would resolve the dispute. 
ii) Fitting the Forum to the Fuss 
Both legal and technical types of disputes found their way into the 
courts and into alternative dispute resolution institutions and, in most 
circumstances, judicial and non-judicial methods were used with ap- 
proximately equal facility to resolve both types of disputes. It appeared 
to us, however, that what we have described as technical cases were 
handled significantly more efficiently by a particular form of non-ju- 
dicial arbitration. Our observations suggest that where the central issue 
is a disagreement about the existence of, or the precise reasons for, a 
manifest defect in a product (or service) and there is no disagreement 
about the terms of the agreement?* the arbitration procedure used by 
52 The process of resolving this type of dispute was observed in small claims courts 
in Ontario and Quebec, in a Better Business Bureau arbitration in Toronto, and 
was discussed with officials in the Better Business Bureau of Buffalo. 
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the Better Business Bureau seems particularly effective compared to 
dispute resolution in court.53 
This process usually resolves these disputes on the basis of the opin- 
ion of a single mutually agreed upon expert retained by the Bureau 
who examines the product, or the output of the service. Usually the 
expert examines the product or service directly in front of the parties 
to the dispute, even if the examination takes place outside the setting 
in which the arbitration or mediation is held. The independent expert 
can and does take the initiative to ask questions of the parties to assist 
in the examination of the product defect or unsatisfactory service. 
Fact finding in this type of situation in court would traditionally be 
based upon the opinion of a non-expert judge evaluating the conflict- 
ing testimony of separate experts and the testimony of the parties or 
others with information. In the Better Business Bureau procedure, in 
contrast, no formal testimony is taken, though the expert may pose. 
questions of the firm and the consumer about the product. The result 
of the Better Business Bureau process will depend on the opinion of 
an expert. In fact, in most situations the parties can and sometimes do 
voluntarily resolve the dispute themselves on the basis of the expert's 
opinion. In courts, this type of dispute is resolved by a judge on the 
basis of conflicting testimony. Rarely is the product itself brought into 
court as this is usually not feasible. 
This aspect of alternative dispute resolution appears to offer sub- 
stantial advantages both to governments and to the private sector as 
an alternative to traditional dispute resolution process. There are ob- 
vious advantages in avoiding the costs of educating judges as to the 
particular product or service in dispute; in avoiding a process in 
which at least two experts are involved in an adversarial fact-determi- 
nation process; and in developing systems which reduce fixed costs 
by bring the decision-maker to the dispute rather than the converse. It 
appears to us that for appropriate technical cases, alternative dispute 
resolution simply offers a better way that cannot easily be adopted by 
the 
On the other hand, it seemed to us that the judicial system would 
probably be the more appropriate venue to resolve the cases involving 
disputes about the terms of an agreement. In these types of legal dis- 
putes, the most salient issues include credibility, and the existence and 
content of legal rules that impose terms on the parties. Courts have 
long experience with such legal aspects of contract and have created 
rules to resolve ambiguities and define implicit contract terms.55 It is 
53 The Better Business Bureaus are voluntary, local associations of retail business 
which individual firms may join for a fee that provide their members with a wide 
variety of services. Some of these involve advocacy in local or other political fora, 
others involve the development of improved relations with customers, and 
included in the last category is the provision of mediation and arbitration services 
between retailers and consumers. Better Business Bureaus are, however, 
organisations run for, by and with the support of business firms. 
54 Our preliminary research indicated that there is a substantial subset of  cases which 
fall within this category. However, further research is required to confirm these 
data. 
55 M.G. Bridge, supra note 5 1 at 427-546. 
Heinonline - -  13 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 101 1993 
102 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Jiisrice 1993 
also probable that judges have considerable experience with the prob- 
lem of credibility, and have developed some expertise in  evaluating 
conflicting testimony. Hence, courts should probably be better 
equipped than alternative dispute institutions to deal with this prob- 
lem. We could not, however, on the basis of our observations, claim 
that alternative dispute resolution institutions were any better or worse 
than courts in assessing credibility. We were not able to gather suffi- 
cient evidence to evaluate which of the two processes - traditional 
legal or alternative dispute resolution using experts -is best designed 
to manage disputes which require assessment of the veracity of infor- 
mation provided by consumers or firms. 
iii) In Small Claims Courts 
Small claims courts, no matter how informal their procedures, feel 
like courts of law. Even the Quebec small claimscourts, which exclude 
counsel, retain the look and feel of a courtroom. While the intent of 
the legislatures in Ontario and Quebec was probably to create a user- 
friendly, informal court - a people's court so to speak - the net result 
is, on first impression, the creation of just another court, little different 
from other courts. This is, in part, the unavoidable consequence of the 
fact that small claims courts are modifications of ordinary courts. Like 
ordinary courts, they must, for example, be public and manifest suffi- 
cient symbolic majesty to demonstrate their power and independence 
from the State. Beneath the first impression there are, however, sig- 
nificant differences between small claims and other courts. 
The judges in the small claims courts we observed acted differently 
from those in superior courts in several ways. They, assisted by their 
clerks, were quite careful to explain court procedures to the parties 
and guide them through the process. The judges almost always played 
a much more active role in soliciting evidence than did their colleagues 
in superior court. This was a clear and necessary adoption of an alter- 
native dispute resolution technique. On the other hand, we saw no 
instances where they initiated and undertook extensive, independent 
questioning which, in theory, would be an acceptable practice in me- 
diation and arbitration. While we did not observe arbitrators and me- 
diators undertaking such questioning, we understand from interviews 
that it can and does occur. Small claims court judges, like their coun- 
terparts in superior courts, always explained the reasons for their find- 
ings so that their decisions did not seem arbitrary. The nature of their 
decisions were, however, sometimes different from what is expected 
in ordinary legal decisions. 
We observed, for example, that in several situations, judges seemed 
to act like mediators sometimes do in that they "split the difference" 
in their award even though they formally found for the plaintiff and 
should, perhaps, have made their award on a winner-take-all basis. In 
one case, for example, a mover provided a supposedly binding esti- 
mate to the consumer but, after the move, charged a considerably 
higher fee. The judge found for the plaintiff but split the difference 
between the charges imposed and the mover's estimate. This type of 
splitting the difference to reach an accommodating solution is more 
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like what one would have expected to have occurred in alternative 
dispute resolution than in court.56 
The procedural rules in small claims courts frequently seem to have 
been adopted from alternative dispute settlement methodol~gy.~~ For 
example, the two courts we observed had pre-trial procedures de- 
signed to allow and encourage the parties to settle before the formal 
hearing. It seemed to us that these procedures were relatively ineffec- 
tive because they occur at the point of trial and the parties may already 
be committed to fighting it out. Moreover, the mediation procedures 
seemed an add-on rather than a salient feature of these small claims 
courts. We were not able, however, to confirm from observation the 
effects of these rules. 
However, recent amendments to the British ColumbiaSmall Claims 
proclaimed in early 199 1, expand the jurisdiction of the court, 
and are designed to allow people who bring claims to the Provincial 
Court to have them resolved and to have enforcement proceedings 
concluded in a speedy, inexpensive and simple manner. The Rules and 
public information booklets provide a sequential guide for parties who 
are involved in the Small Claims process, from filing an initial claim 
to enforcing an order. While parties may be legally represented, the 
program is designed for lay litigants and the information relating to 
all small claims procedures is written in plain language. Mandatory 
settlement conferences are presided over by Provincial Court Judges 
and are intended to encourage settlement of cases, and if settlement is 
not possible, narrow the issues under dispute and help the parties pre- 
pare their cases for trial. Settlement conferences take place in an in- 
formal setting, in "settlement conference rooms", and generally re- 
quire 20 to 30 minutes to complete. A number of Provincial Court 
Judges have been trained in mediation. However, the settlement con- 
ference differs from the practice of mediation in two key respects. 
First, the conference is mandatory, and a basic tenet of mediation is 
that parties voluntarily agree to mediate. Second, the conference fo- 
cuses on identifying legal issues and achieving settlement, rather than 
on the process of fully discussing all issues and attempting to reach 
agreement through compromise and mutual agreement.59 
56 While mediation in alternative dispute resolution is often thought of as a means 
to split the difference between conflicting claims there is some evidence that this 
occurs much less frequently than is suggested by anecdotal evidence. See, 
Vidmar, supra note 14 at 136. 
57 See, for example, in Quebec, Art. 975 C.C.P.; in Ontario, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, r. 50.01 ; and in British Columbia, Small Claims Rules r. 7(14). All of 
these rules suggest that the judge act like a mediator in order to settle a dispute 
prior to, or while undertaking, legal adjudication. 
58 S.B.C., 1989, c.38. Section 3 of the Act identifies the scope of the program. 
Specifically, the Act and Rules apply to claims for debt or damages, recovery of 
personal property, or performance of services where the amount claimed is 
$10,000 or less. Monetary jurisdiction was increased from $3,000 to $10,000 in 
1991. 
59 As a matter of public policy, the reforms in 1991 were introduced within the 
context of a court and judicial process. Even at settlement conferences, judges 
have the authority to make legally binding orders. 
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Prior to the reforms, there were approximately 35,000 claims filed 
in British Columbia each year. After the reforms, almost 50,000claims 
are filed each year. This translates to a 43% increase in the numbers 
of filings since February, 1991. Prior to the reforms, 24% of total 
claims were scheduled for trial. After the reforms, 34% of total claims 
are scheduled for settlement conferences, and 8% of total claims are 
scheduled for trials after settlement  conference^.^^ 
The evidentiary rules used in small claims court were in design and 
in operation much more relaxed than those used in superior court. 
Hearsay was often permitted, as was what might seem to be legally 
irrelevant testimony. On the other hand, the judges did not seek out 
hearsay or legally irrelevant testimony. In the arbitration we observed 
in Buffalo's Better Business Bureau, the arbitrator sought out legally 
irrelevant testimony in order to get to the roots of the dispute before 
her because by getting into the background of the dispute (however 
legally irrelevant it might be) the arbitrator hoped to encourage vol- 
untary settlement. She was unsuccessful in attaining that goal in the 
case observed. We understand from interviews that it is common prac- 
tice for arbitrators to seek out the roots of a dispute even if the testi- 
mony involved is legally irrelevant to the case. Judges do not in theory 
act in this way and were not observed to have done so. 
Based upon our observations and interviews, small claims courts 
have adopted some alternative dispute resolution techniques and are 
considerably more user-friendly than superior courts. This is not sur- 
prising since judicial procedures are not, in the main, inherently in 
opposition to most traditional alternative dispute resolution ap- 
proaches and techniques. Small claims court processes can in theory, 
and were in fact observed to, converge with alternative dispute reso- 
lution processes. For example, small claims courts can and have low- 
ered fees; reduced waiting times; limited or excluded legal advisors; 
relaxed evidentiary rules, and even used mediation procedures to in- 
duce pre-trial settlement. But there appear to be inherent limits to con- 
vergence. 
Small claims courts need to remain open to the public if they are to 
remain courts within a Western legal tradition. This necessarily limits 
the adoption of some alternative dispute resolution techniques. Small 
claims courts are also limited by the need to treat the judge in a manner 
which symbolically demonstrates his or her independence, power and 
status. This aspect of the operation of small claim courts cannot be 
compromised because the legitimacy of the court depends on its dem- 
onstrated independence from the State. Activist judges, willing to 
probe to the roots of disputes in order to achieve voluntary settlement, 
are theoretically possible, though they are unlikely to emerge from the 
current Canadian legal culture. Finally, even the most informal small 
claims court cannot match the accessibility and comfort afforded by 
a small private arbitration or mediation session held in a small room 
with an accessible third party.61 
60 Discussion with Mr. Bruce Heayn, Director, Policy, Planning and Evaluation, 
Ministry of the Attorney-General, British Columbia, January 1993. 
61 Indeed, some jurisdictions in the United States and Canada have decided to make 
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Based on our observations, small claims court have tended to con- 
verge with non-judicial alternative dispute resolution and there is, per- 
haps, room for more reform. Nevertheless, there are inherent limits to 
the ability of courts to imitate non-legal institutions. 
iv) Alternative Dispute Resolution in Action 
Alternative dispute resolution can take so many forms that it is quite 
misleading to characterize it in any one way. The Better Business Bu- 
reaus, for example, attempt quite informal mediation when they first 
receive a complaint - usually by telephone. This is undoubtedly a 
form of alternative dispute resolution. Later the Better Business Bu- 
reau may undertake an arbitration which looks more like a formal 
hearing and this, too, is alternative dispute resolution. There are alter- 
native dispute resolution processes in Ontario to resolve disputes about 
vehicles which are not meeting consumer quality and performance 
expectations, and there is even alternative dispute resolution for dis- 
putes about the price and quantity of gas or electricity delivered to 
people's homes or businesses. Our observations focused on the proc- 
esses used by the Better Business Bureaus because they were most 
adoptable for extensive use in a wide variety of situations. 
The Better Business Bureau dispute resolution approach involves a 
complicated mix of information dissemination and transfer, mediation 
and formal arbitrati0n.6~ Initially, most consumer complaints to the 
Better Business Bureau of Buffalo, and most other Bureaus in the 
United States and Canada, are received by teleph0ne.6~ Mediation is 
rarely attempted at this first stage. Rather information is obtained and 
consumers are urged to discuss their problem with the firm, if they 
have not already done so. The consumer is also informed of the dispute 
resolution services of the Bureau and the need to gather certain types 
of information so that their complaint can be processed. At this stage 
the consumer is, in effect, being educated. 
If the consumer and firm are unable to resolve a dispute and the 
consumer is willing to proceed outside of the court system, a more 
structured mediation process will then be instituted by the Bureau. At 
this stage, the Bureau generally pursues an informal approach to me- 
diation in which it acts as a conduit for information and dialogue be- 
tween the firm and the consumer. Relatively few disputes proceed 
beyond this stage to more formal structured mediation and arbitration 
in the form of a stylized case where the parties confront each other 
with testimony and evidence. An informally mediated solution be- 
their courts more attractive to users through the addition of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques and have done relatively little to encourage non-judicial 
dispute resolution. In New York State, however, the clear thrust is to reduce the 
use of government funded courts and expand the role of private sector 
adjudication. This is clear in the procedures that are encouraged under new 
consumer legislation. See infin note 74. 
62 This typical approach was discussed with officials of the Better Business Bureau 
of Buffalo and observed in action at the Better Business Bureau of Toronto. 
63 In virtually all large Better Business Bureau offices there is a bank of phones 
staffed by employees who receive and record initial consumer complaints. 
Heinonline - -  13 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 105 1993 
106 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 1993 
tween the consumer and member-firm is always preferred and a formal 
mediation and arbitration hearing is considered to be a last resort.64 
In theory, most consumer disputes involving member-firms should 
be subject to this Bureau process and resolved through it. In fact, in- 
dividual Bureaus in concert with their members can choose to what 
degree they will encourage more formal mediation and arbitration pro- 
cedures. This decision is not, however, made unilaterally since the 
consumer complainant must agree to that process. All consumers 
should, in theory, enter the Better Business Bureau process since they 
do not give up any legal rights by doing so. In practice, however, 
consumers are more likely to agree to arbitration or mediation with a 
well known and respected Better Business B~reau.6~ 
Some Bureaus have few or no formal mediation\arbitration hear- 
ings, though all are active in informal mediation. The differences be- 
tween individual Bureaus can be substantial with some, such as the 
Better Business Bureau of Buffalo, undertaking anywhere from 60 to 
100 formal mediation\arbitration hearings per year and with others in 
cities of a similar size doing much fewer or none. The difference may 
come about because some Bureaus either do not have the necessary 
funds to support a programme or local consumers and\or firms have 
no knowledge nor interest in such ~ndertakings.6~ 
There are several interesting aspects of the "formal" mediation and 
arbitration, process used by the Better Business Bureau. While details 
vary depending on the arbitrator\rnediator and source of the dispute:' 
some aspects of the process are consistent. In general, rules of evi- 
dence and articulated burdens of proof are extremely relaxed even 
compared to small claims court. The mediator\arbitrator provided for 
a case by the Better Business Bureau, subject to the agreement of the 
parties, is usually an unpaid volunteer trained, at his or her own ex- 
pense, in programs arranged by the Better Business Bureau. In some 
programs and in some Bureaus, however, the mediator\arbitrator is 
paid a relatively small sum for his or her services. The parties can tell 
64 Member-businesses have a tendency to settle through an informal mediatory 
process because they cannot decline to enter more formal mediation and 
arbitration procedures. Consumer complainants can enter this initial informal 
process and if it is, from their perspective unsuccessful, proceed to more formal 
mediation and arbitration or they may, at any point, simply go to court. 
65 The Better Business Bureau of Buffalo has a particularly active programme of 
formal mediationiarbitration in part because the presence of other, often higher 
profile, arbitration programmes such as those in support of special consumer 
legislation encourage consumers and businesses to trust and use their services. 
66 Our initial observation was that the fiscal explanation for the small number of 
formal mediation or arbitration proceedings in some Bureaus is not persuasive. 
For example, in the Better Business Bureau of Buffalo, and in many other 
Bureaus, the arbitrators are volunteers, and the cost of arbitration is extremely 
low. 
67 That is, variations will occur in the source of consumer disputes subject to 
arbitration. In some cases, the dispute will have arisen in the ordinary Bureau 
process; in other cases it will haveemerged from legislatively mandated consumer 
dispute resolution procedures; in still other cases, it may have come from some 
other source. 
Heinonline - -  13 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 106 1993 
Vol. 13 Redress Through Alternative Dispute Resolution 107 
the stories including background details as they please subject only to 
constraints - which are usually gentle or absent - imposed by the 
arbi trator\mediator. 
In one way, a typical Bureau arbitration hearing - as compared to 
the more informal mediation process - may be somewhat frustrating 
for the parties as compared to a typical legal hearing. In most arbitra- 
tion situations, the decision of the arbitrator does not immediately fol- 
low the hearing but may be delayed for some days.68 While this enables 
the arbitrator to consider the various issues which are to be decided 
quite carefully, it is somewhat disquieting for the parties. In most con- 
sumer litigation resolved in small claims court proceedings, the judge 
will render a verdict irnmediatel~.~~ 
The most distinguishing general feature of all the alternative dispute 
resolution institutions we reviewed is that they were always private, 
involving only the parties to the dispute and a third party. This is usu- 
ally a decided advantage from the perspective of resolving the dispute 
and also permits the parties a degree of comfort that is unattainable in 
court. But privacy can be a disadvantage. For example, our limited 
observations of the Ontario motor vehicle arbitration process provide 
some interesting insights into the paradox caused by the desire by the 
typical consumer-disputant for a "comfortable" forum. The Ontario 
Motor Vehicle Arbitration Program (often called OMVAP) is a non- 
legislated program administered by the Better Business Bureau and 
paid for by vehicle manufacturers and sellers. Use of the program by 
a consumer is free but ordinary requires giving up further pursuit of 
the case in court. 
Our observations of this arbitration program suggest that the pri- 
vacy (and consequent greater comfort) offered by this alternative dis- 
pute forum may work against the interest of the aggrieved consumer. 
The complainants in this process were, of course, always different and 
had little or no acquaintance with the procedures and had no knowl- 
edge of how cases similar to theirs were resolved. The arbitrators, 
while familiar with the process, served only irregularly since they were 
rotated frequently. The representatives of the car companies, however, 
were virtually always the same and had extensive experience unavail- 
able to the other participants. Privacy and informality in these circum- 
stances may .have worked against the interests of the complainants, 
though it was impossible for us to ascertain this with any degree of 
accuracy since we could not determine whether outcomes in small 
claims court would have been better or worse for consumers than the 
results obtained in this forum.70 
68 This delay occurred in all of the situations which we observed. 
69 This is not, of course, a necessary difference in procedure since it is possible for 
judges to delay their decision and for arbitrators to provide an immediate 
determination. It may reflect, however, the position of a judge who, once one 
moves beyond questions of law and credibility, may have little to contribute to 
the dispute resolution process. The expert arbitrator may have substantial 
independent information and experience which he or she must integrate into the 
decision-making process. 
70 The comfort level of complainants is certainly greater in the Ontario Motor 
Vehicle Arbitration process (and likely in all alternative dispute resolution fora), 
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A second general feature of the alternative dispute resolution insti- 
tutions we observed is their diversity. It is clearly possible to tailor 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism to particular situations. The 
Better Business Bureaus used at least three different forms of alterna- 
tive dispute resolution procedures to "fit" different types of situ- 
a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  The federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
designed a process specifically to resolve disputes about the costs and 
amounts of gas and electricity delivered to firms and individuals. The 
ability to design the "forum to fit the fuss" is one of the most important 
general characteristics of alternative dispute resolution. 
A final significant feature of alternative dispute resolution which 
we observed is its vulnerability to individual local circumstances. In 
some communities, alternative dispute resolution institutions flour- 
ished and provided a lively, well known alternative to the courts. In 
others, few or no alternative dispute resolution institutions exist. Judg- 
ing by our observations, two problems confront those who would like 
to have more institutions doing alternative dispute resolution. There 
is, first, a need to generate cases to be resolved and, second, a need to 
develop a means to pay for the cost associated with processing the 
cases generated. 
V) Generation of Cases 
Small claims courts have few difficulties generating cases. If an 
aggrieved consumer suffers a loss below the statutory amount that 
permits the use of small claims and believes that it is worth 
seeking redress, he or she will usually think first about the courts. The 
generation of cases for courts is determined largely by the calculation 
people make when deciding whether their potential gain is worth the 
time and money necessary to take legal action. Courts can rather easily 
affect this calculation by charging less for access, simplifying proce- 
dures or taking any number of other steps (including the use of alter- 
native dispute resolution techniques) to change the calculation of po- 
tential users. 
Generation of cases is far less straightforward for alternative dispute 
settlement institutions. Our observations suggest that the key to gen- 
erating cases for these institutions, both in Canada and the United 
States, is the presence of sophisticated ancillary systems and institu- 
tions which direct disputes to these non-judicial institutions. Our ob- 
servations suggest that alternative dispute settlement cases were not 
as compared to a courtroom. But the public and rule-oriented court environment 
was designed, in part, to even the playing field between disputants of differing 
power and experience. Nevertheless, it is typically the weaker party that often 
demands a more informal, private forum. 
71 The three different forms of alternative dispute resolution used by the Better 
Business Bureaus include, what we would describe as informal mediation, formal 
mediation and expert-centred arbitration. The Better Business Bureaus would not, 
perhaps, use these precise terms. 
72 The maximum amount of a claim in small claims court in Quebec is $3,000 (see 
Art. 953 C.C.P.); in Ontario, $6,000 (see R.R.O. 1992, Reg. 335); and in British 
Columbia, $10,000 (see Small Claims Court Act, S.B.C. 1989, c.38, s.3). 
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generated by references or transfers from small claims courts. The 
crucial decision about whether a case would go to court or to alterna- 
tive dispute resolution is usually made by consumers almost acciden- 
tally without any evaluation of whether the dispute might be more 
efficiently dealt with in or outside of the legal system. 
Disputes which were generated for non-judicial settlement emerged 
from a wide variety of sources. Those generated by the Better Business 
Bureaus came from two basic streams. The "traditional" pool of dis- 
putes handled by Better Business Bureaus in Canada and the United 
States results from complaints to that organisation by consumers about 
member-firms in the Bureau. In Canada as well as in the United States, 
a firm which joins a Better Business Bureau usually agrees to permit 
the Bureau of which it is a member to mediate and, if necessary, arbi- 
trate disputes which arise with consumers. This aspect of membership 
in a Better Business Bureau has the potential to create a flow of me- 
diation and arbitration cases for the Bureau to resolve. However, in 
practice, the actual number of cases mediated or arbitrated by different 
Better Business Bureaus varies quite 
Aside from this traditional source for cases to be mediated or arbi- 
trated, consumer legislation in some jurisdictions has created a sepa- 
rate pool of cases which might not otherwise have been susceptible to 
mediation and arbitration. Typically, these laws create both special 
rights or warranties for consumers of particular goods and services 
and alternative non-judicial processes to adjudicate those rights.74 The 
mediation and arbitration associated with these consumer laws is often 
managed by neutral, non-governmental agencies with experience in 
resolving consumer disputes such as the Better Business Bureau.75 
73 The Bener Business Bureau of Buffalo, because it is strongly supported by the 
business community and is very well known for its work in dispute resolution by 
the people of Buffalo and the surrounding communities, receives many consumer 
complaints for resolution. Other Better Business Bureaus that are less well known 
or those which give little emphasis to the role of "dispute resolver" or whose 
members do not encourage the intervention of their Bureau in disputes would 
have fewer requests from consumers for mediation or arbitration. As well, in any 
particular community, the rate of membership in the local Bureau will vary 
depending on many circumstances. If thereare fewer businesses that are members, 
there will be fewer opportunities to resolve disputes. 
74 In New York State, laws of this type include "lemon" laws for new car buyers, 
see 15 CLS New York Statutes (amended to 1992), General Business Law, 
Section 198-a and those providing special warranties for purchasers of manu- 
factured (usually mobile) homes (creating a so called "bill of rights" for mobile 
home residents), see 28 CLS New York Statutes (amended to 1992), Real Property 
Law, Section 233. In Ontario, a non-legislative approach was taken to creating a 
consumer arbitration programme to address automobile disputes arising between 
consumers, retailers and manufacturers. See News Release\Communique dated 
November 9, 1987 of the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, 
Ontario, I .  
75 For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of these consumer laws is that 
each piece of legislation is deliberately designed to induce those subject to the 
law, car manufacturers for example, to create and to fund a non-judicial means 
for settling dispute based on the rights-creating part of the law. Consumers retain 
the right to use the courts, if they wish. Ontario has done much the same thing 
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These laws have four different types of effects on alternative dispute 
resolution programmes. First and most obviously, this legislation has 
created a stream of cases which is funded by the private sector and 
often resolved through Better Business Bureau programmes (or other 
similar organisations in the private sector). Second, this legislation 
assists in supporting the traditional Bureau mediation arid arbitration 
programmes by providing overhead financing to the Bureau which 
helps support its more traditional alternative dispute resolution pro- 
gramme. Third, this type of legislation provides status and legitimacy 
to non-judicial dispute resolution which can encourage consumers and 
firms to use alternative dispute resolution rather than the courts. Fi- 
nally, this legislatively sanctioned role for the Better Business Bureau 
encourages firms to join their local Bureau and further strengthens the 
organisation's ability to support its dispute resolution programmes. 
Firms, consumers and governments face a complex series of calcu- 
lations which determines the number and kinds of disputes which will 
be subject to alternative dispute resolution and which will be decided 
in traditional court systems. Firms are sometimes motivated to choose 
non-judicial dispute resolution by the high costs associated with courts 
or by the expectation that a non-judicial approach might maintain the 
goodwill of the customer. But the goodwill of the customer may al- 
ready have been compromised by the dispute, and many firms pay a 
fixed retainer to legal counsel that covers most legal expenses related 
to minor disputes. As well, a traditional legal forum might reduce the 
number of disputes which are resolved against the firm because the 
perceived high cost of legal adjudication may discourage claimants.76 
In general, firms probably prefer informal mediation followed, if nec- 
essary, by legal adjudication to an alternative dispute resolution proc- 
ess which includes non-judicial arbitration. 
Consumers with sufficient information to make an informed choice 
often select non-judicial dispute resolution procedures over courts be- 
cause these procedures commonly resolve disputes with less delay 
and, in most cases, do not generate any out of pocket costs to the 
complainant. As well, in some jurisdictions non-judicial approaches 
are well known, respected and are thought to be legitimate. The vast 
majority of consumers do not, however, have sufficient information 
to make an informed choice and simply go to court. In most jurisdic- 
tions, this will involve additional expense and delays compared to 
non-judicial dispute resolution. Our research suggests that consumers 
rarely, if ever, choose between courts or alternative dispute resolution 
on the basis of the type of dispute they are involved in, though this 
should be a critical aspect of the choice of venue. 
Governments have both fiscal and ideological motives that deter- 
mine whether and how alternative dispute resolution techniques will 
with its automobile arbitration plan without the creation of special new rights for 
consumers. 
76 In New YorkState, businesses have had to beencouraged by legislation to support 
and use non-judicial fora for dispute resolution and some Bureaus do not receive 
encouragement for their members to make mediation and arbitration a high profile 
programme. 
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be used.77 Governments often take an interest in alternative dispute 
resolution as a means to save government resources. Courts are ex- 
pensive and paid for by government. When non-judicial alternative 
dispute resolution is undertaken and paid for in the private sector, no 
financial costs accrue to government. It may also reduce the pressure 
to spend more on the courts because it reduces the number of cases in 
the judicial system. 
Governments also believe that if courts are made more efficient, 
there should be a savings in resources. This often prompts government 
to use alternative dispute settlement techniques within the judiciary, 
usually in small claims courts. When governments make mediation 
procedures or other alternative dispute resolution techniques a regular 
part of the legal process in small claims or other courts, i t  can, how- 
ever, result in somewhat higher court costs because of the additional 
steps in the judicial process. Moreover, a more efficient, user-friendly 
court will probably encourage greater use of the courts with an asso- 
ciated increase in costs to government. 
Some governments are ideologically motivated to use non-judicial 
dispute resolution because it is thought to be non-confrontational and 
voluntary compared to traditional legal adjudication. Governments 
motivated in this way face choices: they can encourage the use of these 
techniques in court; they can induce the use of non-judicial alternative 
dispute resolution in the private sector; or they can develop policies 
which are directed at both ends. While there is no obvious right choice, 
it appears that the only route to assured fiscal savings is to encourage 
dispute resolution in non-governmental institutions. 
While there are several effective means for government and firms 
to generate cases for non-judicial alternative dispute resolution, few 
of these procedures are actively pursued. It would be possible, for 
example, to provide more information to potential complainants about 
the choices which they have for obtaining redress and the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. This information could be provided either 
at the time that a complaint is made to the merchant or at the time when 
a case is first brought to small claims court or both. Our observations 
suggest that this type of information is only provided by some Better 
Business Bureaus. 
Finally, governments can generate cases for non-judicial dispute 
resolution through legislation, like that in place in the New York 
State,78 which encourages non-judicial redress of particular classes of 
consumer disputes. This strategy might encourage non-judicial re- 
dress indirectly, through the legitimation of the private institutions 
which perform this function in any number of ways. 
vi) Financing Alternative Dispute Resolution 
A key aspect of encouraging non-judicial alternative dispute reso- 
77 These background comments about governments and alternative dispute 
resolution are based on our research, including field trips to Toronto and Buffalo 
and take into account discussions with government officials in Alberta and in 
British Columbia. 
78 See supra note 74.  
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lution is the development of methods to finance the operating costs of 
the mediationfarbitration process. The court dispute resolution is sub- 
sidized by taxpayers though some marginal costs are borne by the 
litigants. Unless financing issues are addressed, it can be anticipated 
that non-judicial dispute resolution will operate at a competitive dis- 
advantage to the publicly subsidized system of courts. The problem is 
that the cost of redress through non-judicial institutions cannot be 
passed to the consumer. If the cost were to be borne by consumers, 
then the non-judicial fora would become too expensive relative to the 
potential gains from redress. Virtually all non-judicial institutions of- 
fering alternative dispute resolution confront the same problem: how 
to finance their system. 
In the case of most Better Business Bureau dispute resolution proc- 
esses, individual consumer complainants do not generally pay for the 
dispute resolution services provided by the Bureau. Virtually all costs, 
other than the opportunity costs of the consumers' time, are borne 
through the membership fees of firms which belong to the Bureau.79 
For Better Business Bureaus, and to an extent for their member-firms, 
dispute resolution may be seen, at least in the short term, as a losing 
proposition since costs are not recoverable and some disputes which 
are addressed by the local Bureau might not have been brought to court 
by the consumer because of the time and money involved in that form 
of dispute resolution. On the other hand, in many circumstances, firms 
0btain.a long term gain in good will and lower legal fees from Bureau 
dispute reso lu t i~n .~  
Non-judicial alternative dispute resolution can also be financed by 
the sellers or manufacturers of particular goods or services. It is un- 
likely, however, that seller\manufacturers will subsidize non-judicial 
dispute resolution when judicial dispute resolution is available for 
free. In fact, it is not at all clear that it is in the self-interest of such 
firms to have any formal adjudicatory process available to buyers. 
Hence, alternative dispute resolution is financed by firms mainly when 
collateral benefits are associated with providing dispute resolution, as 
in the Better Business Bureau model, or when legislation induces firms 
to support alternative dispute resolution, as in the case of New York 
State mobile home legi~lation.~' While governments can, and in some 
instances have, induced firms to pay for non-judicial dispute resolu- 
tion as a service to consumers, there are problems associated with this 
approach. 
79 Some Better Business Bureaus, such as those in New YorkCity, do levy a minimal 
charge for certain alternate dispute resolution services. 
80 As well, arbitration costs are reduced through the use of extensive and active 
volunteer participation in the dispute resolution process. 
81 In New York State, owners of mobile home parks containing three or more units 
must register annually with the state Division of Housing and Community 
Revitalization (DHCR). In addition, DHCR is responsible for enforcing s.233 of 
the Real Property Law, also known as the "Bill of Rights for Mobile Home 
TenantsW.To assist in discharging this responsibility, DHCR has signed acontract 
with the New York State Association of Community Dispute Resolution Centres 
to provide mediation of certain landlordltenant disputes under s.233. 
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Research and our observations suggest that alternative dispute reso- 
lution mechanisms which are paid for by sellers may result in proc- 
esses which "tilt" towards the interests providing financial support. 
There has been considerable criticism of American "lemon" laws 
which generally induce manufacturers to provide alternative dispute 
resolution. The problems cited include arbitration processes which 
favour manufacturers and weak oversight by state governments.g2 Our 
own observations of the Ontario motor vehicle arbitration process, 
which is paid for by manufacturers, were inconclusive in ascertaining 
whether that process may be subject to similar criticism. 
It is possible to design a process which is paid for by sellers and that 
appears to be even-handed, indeed the Better Business Bureaus seem 
to have done just that. But the financial support for the Bureau proc- 
esses are spread throughout the business community. If alternative 
dispute resolution paid for by sellers is to be even-handed, it appears 
necessary either to obtain funds from a wide base of support in the 
business community or to assure substantial distance between those 
providing the support and the actual operation of the program. 
Governments must, if they continue to subsidize small claims courts 
procedures, determine if gains might be achieved by shifting some 
resources to the subsidization of private alternative dispute resolution 
processes. Our research suggests that there should be substantial sav- 
ings associated with a shift of judicial resources to private sector ad- 
judication. These gains would be associated with less expensive adju- 
dicators, lower per case marginal cost where expert volunteer 
arbitrators are involved, and lower fixed costs as compared to the op- 
eration of traditional courts. Most important, private enterprise will, 
if the system is designed properly, be engaged in ongoing improve- 
ment and development of its alternative dispute resolution process, 
where it faces competition from other operations. The evidence sug- 
gests, however, that governments will probably need to retain some 
type of at least minimal oversight role to assure that adjudication, out- 
side the judiciary, is reasonably fair.83 
The role of the government in inducing alternative dispute resolu- 
tion institution might be limited to the introduction of legislation - 
at a modest cost to the state - which provides a secure source of 
consumer complaints for the private alternative dispute resolution op- 
eration. In addition, governments can, through publicity and consumer 
education programs, inform consumers and increase public awareness 
of private alternatives to traditional legal consumer redress mecha- 
nisms. A particularly useful step might be to increase the legitimacy 
and authority of the private alternative dispute resolution process 
through education and publicity campaigns. Finally, governments can, 
82 See "The Sour Truth About Lemon Laws", author not noted, (Jan. 1993) 
Corzsumm Reports at 40. 
83 The devil is, as usual, in the details. It is clear that the oversight role of  government 
could and should vary with the circumstances. Relevant factors which might be 
considered in determining the appropriate degree and type of  oversight include: 
the nature of the forum, the type of  disputes being resolved, the number of users, 
the stakes, and the capability of the parties to protect themselves. 
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through relatively minor selective funding, bear some of the fixed 
costs of private alternative dispute resolution processes. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Several interesting and sometimes surprising conclusions flow 
from our observations, research and analysis. 
First, there are few essential or inherent aspects of the judicial proc- 
ess which constrain the design and operation of traditional courts. 
Hence, it is possible to make small claims and other courts more effi- 
cient and user-friendly by adopting many alternative dispute resolu- 
tion techniques for use in the courts. There is considerable evidence 
that steps inthis direction have already begun, but more is possible. 
In particular, court rules could be changed to encourage judges to be 
somewhat more "activist" in illiciting evidence and more creative 
(within the bounds of the law) in designing awards. There is also con- 
siderable potential to make better use of pre-trial mediation as has been 
done in British Columbia. 
It should be noted, however, that it appears that there will likely be 
very small or no savings when governments introduce alternative dis- 
pute resolution techniques into court procedures, though this may be 
desirable for other reasons. It is possible, in fact, that there may be an 
increase in costs to government associated with reforms that make 
courts more user friendly. This could occur because further steps are 
created in the judicial process and because reforms may increase the 
numbers of users. 
Second, increasing the use of non-governmental alternative dispute 
resolution can result in considerable saving for government and has 
the potential to provide better redress than that afforded by the courts 
in certain situations. The most effective models for increasing the use 
of non-judicial alternative dispute resolution seems to be offered by 
the Better Business Bureaus observed in Toronto and Buffalo (though 
other non-governmental organisations might, of course, adopt these 
same techniques and procedures). New York State encourages alter- 
native dispute resolution by providing funding to the Better Business 
Bureaus for several tasks which assists the organisation both in gaining 
prestige in the community which encourages membership, and in off-set- 
ting fixed costs and thus allowing hnds to be available for commer- 
cial\consumer dispute resolution. State legislation also encourages se- 
lected manufacturers aid sellers to provide alternative dispute resolution 
through independent agencies, including the Better Business Bureaus. 
Third, the success of alternative dispute resolution systems depends, 
to a significant degree, on associated processes to generate cases. The 
experience in New York State demonstrates that governments can en- 
courage the use of alternative dispute resolution in the consumer con- 
text by imaginative legislative drafting directed to that end. 
Fourth, alternative dispute resolution, as practised by the Better 
Business Bureau in what we have termed technical consumer cases 
(where a decision on the reasons for the physical characteristics of a 
product would resolve the dispute), appears to be an extremely effec- 
tive means of dispute resolution relative to traditional adjudication in 
the courts. This approach to alternative dispute resolution is probably 
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not transferable to courts except with substantial, and piobably im- 
practical, modifications of traditional judicial processes. 
Recommendations 
With regard to the generation and streaming of cases for both 
small claims courts and alternative dispute resolution we recom- 
mend that: 
1. Small claims courts provide potential plaintiffs with informa- 
tion about available alternative dispute resolution processes at 
the point where small claims are first filed;84 
2. The information provided to consumers by the small claims 
courts include the advantages and disadvantages of small 
claims courts and alternative dispute resolution procedures in 
different situations; 
3. Firms and business organisations make available to the public 
similar information about small claims courts and alternative 
dispute resolution when and where consumers initially register 
serious complaints; 
4. Small claims courts make provisions facilitating the transfer 
of cases begun in that forum within a reasonable time after the 
plaintiff has filed a complaint, if both parties agree to pursue 
the claim by means of alternative dispute resolution. If alter- 
native dispute is chosen, then the court would transfer the case 
to one of perhaps a number of organisations undertaking 
alternative dispute resolution, and 
5. All information provided consumers seeking redress should 
suggest that technical type cases be streamed to alternative 
dispute resolution and legal type cases be streamed to small 
claims 
With regard to the operation of small claims courts we recommend 
that: 
6. Governments introduce changes to small claims court proce- 
dures to allow and encourage judges to take a somewhat more 
active role in illiciting evidence and to encourage more imagi- 
native awards (this may require legislative change) and 
7. Special steps or procedures in small claims courts designed to 
84 This may and probably will involve government in some kind of evaluative role 
to determine which kinds of non-judicial alternative dispute resolution forums or 
programs are to be listed. This may involve the eventual development of some 
type of licensing function or at least the development of certain criteria to define 
acceptable alternative dispute resolution. 
85 It may sometimes be difficult to classify cases and, conceivably complainant- 
consumers may need or want to seek help from small claims court officials in 
determining the type of dispute which they are involved in. These officials already 
play a similar "guiding" role in helping people to determine whether or not they 
should bring a case and how to their draft complaint. Of course, consumers- 
complainants always have the right to bring their case in whichever forum they 
prefer. 
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achieve a voluntary settlement be accompanied by the use of 
judges or other highly trained personnel to undertake court 
sanctioned or mandated mediation. 
With regard to alternative dispute resolution we recommend that: 
8. Legislation be passed, where it is absent, to assure that deci- 
sions produced in alternative dispute resolution fora have the 
same force and effect as those from small claims courts with 
possible review by superior or appellate courts restricted to 
procedural fairness and jurisdictional issues; 
9. Innovative legislation be used to encourage alternative dispute 
resolution as an alternative to legal adjudication and to induce 
firms in the private sector to pay for such dispute reso lu t i~n;~~ 
10. Better Business Bureaus and other similar organisations should 
be encouraged to seek cases for their alternative dispute reso- 
lution programs by offering them tasks paid for by government 
which will provide a financial and reputational base for their 
dispute resolution services; 
11. Where alternative dispute resolution for a particular business 
sector is supported entirely or substantially by that sector, the 
resulting processes should automatically be considered to be 
in need of special procedural safeguards. These might include, 
for example, publication and provision to consumers of typical 
awards made by the forum in common situations and periodic 
and stringent public reviews of the institution to assess both 
substantive and procedural fairness in the operation of the 
program. 
86 It would be best, if firms from a variety of sectors could be induced to suppor't 
alternative dispute resolution through cross sectoral association like the Better 
Business Bureaus, Chambers of Commerce, or the Retail Council. Where single 
industry support is unavoidable, then appropriate oversight is necessary. 
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